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Abstract 
How do humans develop the ability to approach and solve diverse, attentionally-demanding 
problems? Current work on problem-solving focuses on well-defined problems in which explicit 
task constraints directly inform the planning and execution of behaviors. However, in situations 
that might be more informative for naturalistic learning and problem-solving, what is necessary 
to solve problems when task constraints, and thus planning abilities, are not as easily accessible?  
Executive functions such as selective attention and working memory seem fundamental to these 
types of activities, yet there is not a clear account of how exactly the coordination of these 
cognitive processes contribute dynamically to this capability over the course of development. 
This study aimed to enhance the current characterization of problem-solving by further 
uncovering relationships among processes of executive functioning to better understand how this 
competence might emerge and self-organize throughout development. To first examine this 
phenomenon in adults, a sample of 86 people between the ages of 18-27 years participated in this 
phase of the study. The experiment consisted of a code-breaking problem-solving task and two 
working memory tasks; the Simon color sequence game, and the Dual N-Back. In the problem-
solving task, participants attempted to solve a correct code using incremental feedback. Overall, 
results suggested that the ability to adequately coordinate information, and thus overall 
performance, decreases when working memory demands are imposed.  
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Changes in the Cognitive Dynamics of Problem-Solving 
         Problem-solving is ubiquitous in the everyday activities of a child. From learning how to 
tie shoes to learning math, problem-solving abilities underly the development of self-directed 
learning. At its core, problem-solving facilitates learning through the discovery of new information 
in our environment (see Newell & Simon, 1972). As adults, humans are quite efficient at solving 
a wide variety of problems that demand different amounts of exploratory behavior, or require 
different solution scopes; however, much of the developmental research on problem-solving has 
focused on a narrow range of problem types (see Keen, 2011 for review). Some researchers have 
emphasized the critical role social interactions play in the development of a more general problem-
solving ability (Ellis & Siegler, 1994). Others have explored how strategy and executive function 
contribute to problem-solving (Siegler, 1999; Zelazo, Müller, Frye & Marcovitch, 2003). 
However, this research has not considered the potentially reciprocal relationships that exist 
between the development of executive function and aspects of cognition that underly the 
development of problem-solving. In order to understand how a general problem-solving ability 
develops in adults, research that focuses on how executive function processes are organized to a 
problem-solving task over development is needed.   
Newell, Shaw and Simon (1958) proposed that theories of problem-solving should: predict 
performance in specified tasks, explain problem-solving via process and mechanism, and account 
for changes in both internal and external conditions that alter problem-solving activity. In order to 
predict performance and to propose processes and mechanisms that generate the performance, 
there needs to be a developmentally appropriate cognitive description of the solver. To date, much 
of the conceptualizations of problem-solving, even the developmental considerations (with the 
notable exception of the seminal works of Piaget, Vygotsky, and the dynamical systems approach 
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of Thelen & Smith), have been formulated solely from the vantage of the adult system. This 
involves applying understandings of the adult cognitive system to children’s behavior (see Luo & 
Baillargeon, 2005). This developmental work has generally disregarded developmental differences 
in sensitivities to the internal and external conditions that can alter the problems a child can solve. 
Oftentimes, the logic of these approaches assumes that using the same task at multiple points in 
development is sufficient for measuring differences in problem-solving. However, it is not clear, 
given the developmental differences in cognition that will emerge over these periods, that these 
types of approaches provide equivalent problems from both the child and adult perspective. 
Therefore, what is needed is a characterization of problem-solving that accounts for developmental 
differences in the structure of problems that can be solved. This consideration is related to the 
tension in the adult problem-solving literature between whether abilities are general or 
context/knowledge dependent (see Keating & Crane, 1990 for review). We propose the key 
process to measure for predicting and explaining performance in a problem-solving context is 
information gathering activity. This perspective suggests the activity of information gathering 
undergoes significant change over development, and is what underlies general problem-solving 
ability in both children and adults.  
 This research attempts to measure changes in cognition that underlie the development of 
problem-solving. In the following sections, perspectives on cognition and problem-solving are 
discussed first from an adult, and then subsequently from a developmental perspective. This is 
then followed by a discussion of the development of executive functions and its role in problem-
solving. This discussion will make the case that in order to understand our general problem-solving 
ability, an understanding of the changes in the coordination of executive processes to problem-
solving tasks across development is needed. As a first step in filling this gap in understanding, we 
   3
consider a study where adults are given a challenging problem-solving task that requires 
participants to discover how to proceed to a solution.  
Traditional Approaches to Problem-Solving  
 Traditional approaches to problem-solving often describe the phenomena in terms of a 
problem’s initial state, solution or goal state, and the series of potential actions that are needed to 
reach that goal state (Newell & Simon, 1972). Sternberg (1986) added a few dimensions to this 
description, portraying problem-solving as a cycle in which there are seven stages: first 
recognizing or identifying the problem, then defining a mental representation of the problem, 
developing strategies, organizing information or knowledge of the problem, allocating mental and 
physical resources, monitoring progress, and lastly, evaluating error and accuracy towards the 
goal. According to Sternberg, the cycle is best navigated when one is able to flexibly, rather than 
sequentially, move between the known steps of the problem. Although this portrayal is a potential 
framework for characterizing how the same task might be a different problem at different points 
in development, it tends to be more useful for characterizing certain types of problems over others; 
namely, well-defined problems.  
Much of the traditional work on problem-solving considers well-defined problems; 
problems in which there is a clearly defined representation of the problem, and consequently, the 
necessary strategies to solve the problem are available at the outset. Using only well-defined 
problems to attempt to understand general problem-solving abilities has led researchers to ignore 
critical information gathering aspects of problem-solving. III-defined problems are classified as 
those in which the problem space is insufficiently constrained by the available information. At the 
outset, the best strategy or step towards the goal state is not clear. The logic for understanding 
problem-solving through well-defined problems is similar to the logic of understanding 
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development through problems that can be presented to multiple age groups; well-defined 
problems provide an opportunity to measure aspects of problem-solving that are believed to be 
independent of context or individual understandings. Although more difficult to study, ill-defined 
problems tend to be more representative of the problems faced in the everyday, such as discovering 
the social activities necessary to make new friends, learning to organize and manage schedules, or 
coming up with and executing a school/work project. A necessary first step towards understanding 
how ill-defined problems are solved is to understand what cognitive capacities underly the adult 
ability to gather information that can direct problem-solving. 
Pretz, Naples and Sternberg (2003) suggest that in Sternberg’s cycle of problem-solving, 
problem recognition, definition, and representation are essential processes in solving ill-defined 
problems. Within this framework, lower-level mechanisms of attention that direct visual gaze, as 
well as higher- level cognitive abilities involved in the encoding and retrieving of information from 
existing memory, aid in the processes of defining and representing a problem (Sternberg, 1986). 
Navigating through the potential solution paths to a problem depends on the information initially 
available, as well as the solver’s ability to discover and encode new and relevant information. It is 
this process of information gathering (discovering, encoding and using) that is essential to the adult 
capacity to solve problems. Although this process has not been directly explored in the adult or in 
the developmental literature, insight into the development of this ability can be found in research 
on the development of Executive Function. 
Development of Executive Function 
 Executive Function (EF) is a comprehensive term for the aspects of cognition involved in 
the coordination and organization of information in higher-order cognitive tasks that require 
effortful attention, such as problem-solving (Diamond & Lee, 2011; Lee, Ng & Ng, 2009; Zelazo, 
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Carter, Reznick & Frye, 1997). Diamond (2013) describes the core components of executive 
function as selective attention, inhibitory control, working memory, and cognitive flexibility. 
Selective attention and inhibitory control involve the ability to direct focus and restrain behavior. 
Working memory (WM) is the ability to hold and process information in a mental workspace and 
cognitive flexibility is the ability to shift between concepts. From Diamond’s (2013) perspective, 
reasoning and problem-solving emerge out of the fundamental functions of EF: selecting, 
inhibiting, and switching. Other conceptions of EF have focused more on the complexity of control 
required to complete tasks (Zelazo et al., 2003). From this perspective, reasoning and problem-
solving emerge out of other fundamental functions of EF: representing, planning and evaluating. 
Under this framework, there are thought to be differences in the structure of rules that children can 
formulate and follow that are based on developmental changes in the abilities to represent, plan 
and evaluate. 
 Research on the development of EF has found substantial change over the preschool years 
(3-5 years of age) (Zelazo, Carter & Reznick, 1997). However, this development has been mostly 
measured by a single EF task (Dimensional Change Card Sort, or DCCS) and there is much debate 
as to what is driving success and failure in this task. For example, some suggest selective attention 
is driving this change (Brooks, Hanauer, Padowska & Rosman, 2003), whereas others have 
suggested rule formulating and following (Zelazo et al., 2003). It is generally acknowledged that 
EF cannot be described as a single function and that tasks like DCCS are just convenient measures 
that provide a crucial first step towards explanation (Zelazo et al., 2003).  In order to use DCCS or 
any task as a route to understanding EF more generally, a general set of functions (represent, plan, 
evaluate vs. select, inhibit, switch) must be assumed; and which set is assumed determines how 
the measures are able to be interpreted. One point of agreement between different functional 
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characterizations of EF is a conceptualization of its composition. It is therefore possible that an 
explanation of the development of EF might be found within the development of the components 
of EF. 
Working memory, a key component of EF, undergoes significant development between the 
ages of 4 and 15 (Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge & Wearing, 2004). However, there is much the 
same debate about the nature of WM development (and WM itself), as there is among those that 
have shaped the research on the development of EF. Although there is agreement about the general 
function of WM as a mental workspace, there are different ways of characterizing the components 
of WM. There are also different ways of characterizing the relationships that exist between 
processing, strategic, and attentional aspects in conjunction with storage capacity. Cowan (2010) 
has argued that there is a real storage capacity limit that determines how much can be held in the 
mental workspace; and this capacity limit is considered to be independent of any strategic or 
attentional process. Baddeley’s expansive view of adult WM incorporates aspects of EF into WM, 
as opposed to viewing WM as a component of EF (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). The fundamental 
premise here is that WM is limited by a tradeoff between resource limits in how much can be 
processed and how much can be stored. Increasing storage would, under this notion, place 
increased demands on information processing resources; and increasing processing resources 
would, in return, demand greater storage. In this way, WM is a mental workspace in which 
immediate information is processed with past knowledge under the guidance of a central executive 
to solve a problem.  
Towse, Hitch, and Hutton (1998) argue that WM isn’t structured by just this tradeoff 
between resources and storage capacity, but rather is shaped by retention. Different problems 
require holding different amounts of information in the mental workspace over time. Both the 
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capacity to retain, as well as knowing what to forget, might be key determiners of WM 
performance. Chi (1978) investigated differences in the ability to remember chess positions 
between children who were experts and adult novices. The main finding was that the experts 
(children) were able to hold more positions in memory than the adult novices. What this indicates 
is that the developmental trajectory of WM (or EF more generally) might not be so direct and 
simple, but rather dependent on knowledge and familiarity with certain domains. Baurer (2014), 
Ornstein & Naus (1985) and others suggest that one’s knowledge base, or a person’s bank of 
experiences and learned information, is the most important organizer and predictor of working 
memory performance (DeMarie & Lopez (2014). From this perspective, the knowledge base 
coordinates the holding of information in WM and directs attention in a given context, in contrast 
to conceptions that focus on working memory’s role in EF, which posit a general ability to 
selectively attend as what is most predictive of WM performance (Gazzaley & Nobre, 2012).  
This conceptual tension might ultimately be reflecting a bi-directional influence over 
development between knowledge and Executive Functions such as selection or rule formulation. 
Indeed, increased sophistication in the ability to allocate attention is a precursor to development 
of strategies that are able to manipulate capacity (Cowan, 1988; Kane & Engle, 2003). What 
changes these limits are the ways in which we are able to organize and act on information in a 
given context. This is similar to Karmiloff-Smith’s (1979) proposal that once a child successfully 
employs a representation of their knowledge in a cognitive task, this representation itself becomes 
a unit on which the cognitive system can act. This metaprocedural behavior doesn’t require explicit 
awareness, but rather reflects a balance between information content and information processing 
(similar to the resource/storage tradeoff that motivated Baddeley’s conceptualization of WM). This 
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characterization of a general tendency in cognitive development towards the metaprocedural 
should thus be reflected in Baddeley’s component models of WM as well. 
Tasks that comprehensively assess Baddeley’s components of working memory by 
individually testing each component via multiple sub-tests, such as the working memory version 
of the comprehensive assessment battery for children (Cabbage, Brinkley, Gray, Alt, Cowan, 
Green & Hogan, 2017) or the working memory test battery (Pickering & Gathercole, 2001),  find 
that the components of working memory most predictive of performance in tasks like mathematical 
reasoning change over time. Meyer et al. (2010) found that the central executive and phonological 
loop were more predictive of 2nd grader’s performance, whereas the visuospatial sketchpad was 
more predictive of 3rd grader’s performance in mathematical reasoning tasks. This shift could 
reflect the metaprocedural developmental tendencies proposed by Karmiloff-Smith (1979). For 
instance, elementary school children are taught various visuospatial representations of 
mathematical problems, therefore this change in components might reflect the emergence of a 
visuospatial metaprocedure from, what is initially, a more linguistic representation. This is 
consistent with Gathercole, Alloway, Willis and Adams (2006) findings that show changes in WM 
components related to reading and mathematical comprehension during a similar time period. 
Further evidence for the developmental tendency towards the metaprocedural may be found in the 
development of what has been termed metacognition. 
Metacognition refers to the ability to reflect, understand, and control learning (Schraw & 
Dennison, 1994). Karmiloff-Smith (1979) proposed that it is metaprocedural behavior that controls 
the balance between information content and information processing; in other words, the 
coordination of the known, not known, and needs to be known in a problem-space. Davidson & 
Sternberg (1998) and Gardner & Hatch (1989) suggested this ability involves forming a 
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representation better suited to selecting plans and to identifying impediments to goals. This is also 
consistent with conceptualizations of metacognition from the perspective of EF (Fernandez-
Duque, Baird & Posner, 2000; Roebers & Feurer, 2015; Bryce, Whitebread & Szucs, 2015). Early 
metacognitive abilities develop between 3 and 5 years of age (Kuhn, 2000). This is the same period 
in which significant advances in the acquisition of language (Dockrell & Campbell, 1986), in the 
representation of categorical knowledge (Sheya & Smith, 2006) and in rule formulating and 
following (Jacques, Zelazo, Kirkham, Semcesen, 1999) seem to emerge. It is possible that 
Executive Function, WM and metacognition might just be different ways of conceptualizing the 
process of controlling how information is represented, acquired and utilized in a problem context. 
What is needed is a systematic, direct study of this process. In order to directly characterize this 
process, a general problem-solving context in which performance does not appear dependent on 
specific or domain knowledge is needed.  
The Current Study  
In this experiment, participants were given one of three versions of a code-breaking 
problem-solving task in which the objective was to guess a four-item color code when given six 
color options, and incremental feedback after each attempt. Versions of this task have been used 
to look at problem-solving previously (e.g., Best, 2000; Laughlin & Barth, 1981), yet none have 
used eye-tracking methodologies, nor have used this task to characterize the cognitive processes 
associated with the task. The three task conditions differed in levels of imposed cognitive load by 
altering the number of previous attempts and their feedback that were visible, thus shifting what 
would feasibly need to be processed by the cognitive system’s working memory in order to be 
successful in the task. The imposition of this cognitive load would theoretically constrain working 
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memory’s ability to both store these attempts as well as process ongoing strategy and incoming 
information simultaneously.  
In the standard condition of this task, participants were able to see all available 
information, attempts, and feedback on those attempts, when working towards a solution. This 
condition provided information regarding the ways in which an adult would act on a problem and 
use information when working memory was presumably not additionally taxed. In the two-trial 
condition, participants were only able to see their previous two attempts starting on game three of 
five. In the zero-trial condition, participants were not able to view any past attempts when making 
a current attempt. These two conditions were meant to tax working memory to a lower and higher 
degree, respectively.  
Participants then completed two separate working memory tasks. These tasks observed 
separate contexts of working memory processing. The Dual N-Back task was used to measure the 
phonological loop, visuospatial sketchpad, and the central executive simultaneously in order to 
view how all aspects of WM together contribute to problem-solving. Then, a color-sequence recall 
task (Simon game) was used to observe how short-term storage more specifically plays a role in 
problem-solving. It was hypothesized that information gathering strategies would differ as a result 
of changing cognitive demands on working memory, and that WM systems that engage both 
storage and processing would be more necessary when increasing the amount of to-be-remembered 
information. We also aimed through exploration to gain a better sense of the dynamic relationship 
between executive cognitive function and activity in problem-solving in order to get an overall 
sense of how these cognitive capacities coordinate in their activity. 
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Method 
Participants  
 The sample consisted of 96 (60 female, Mage = 19.38, SD = 1.79, range = 18-27 years) 
participants recruited from the University of Connecticut’s participant pool. A total of 10 
participants were excluded due to language barrier in understanding directions, technical 
difficulties or experimenter error, leaving a total of 86 participants (54 female, Mage = 19.28, SD 
= 1.60 range = 18-27 years). Participants were randomly assigned to a problem-solving condition 
prior to their arrival (standard condition: n = 29; two-trial condition: n = 29; zero-trial condition: 
n = 28). Participants received in-course credit for participating.  
Apparatus 
 Participants were dressed in head-mounted eye-tracking glasses upon arrival. The data 
were recorded via scene and pupil cameras; however the analysis for this will not be discussed in 
the current paper. All tasks were played on a wall-mounted television monitor (86 in. diagonally) 
where participants sat at a table that was placed directly in front of the screen (approximately 
30in.). All tasks were run on an Alienware computer that was connected through HDMI to the 
television monitor. The code-breaking task and Simon game were both created and run through a 
Unity platform. The Dual N-Back was gathered from an open-source version created by 
BrainWorkshop through Jaeggi and Colleagues (2008). Participants responded to all tasks using 
a Logitech gaming mouse.  
Procedure  
         Participants were first dressed in head mounted eye-trackers. They sat at a table in front of 
a large wall-mounted monitor and were given a wireless computer mouse for game-response. 
Participants then fixated their gaze on a handful of small icons on a screen to calibrate the eye-
   12
tracker. Afterward, participants were provided directions for their first task, the code-breaking 
game. The Dual N-Back or Simon games were presented in counterbalanced order following the 
code-breaking task. 
Code-Breaking Task. The code-breaking game was always presented first. All 
participants were read scripted directions, detailing all necessary information. In the two-trial 
condition, participants were told “you might start to notice that some of your guesses will start to 
disappear. In this case, just do your best to guess the correct code”. In the zero-trial condition, 
participants were told “you will only be able to view one guess at a time, so do your best to pay 
attention”. Next, a presentation of example feedback with symbols (instead of colors) was 
provided and participants were asked what certain types of feedback would tell them about their 
response (e.g., “If you chose these four symbols and received four white feedback pins, what would 
that tell you about the symbols you chose?”). This was done to ensure participants comprehended 
the directions. If participants did not comprehend, experimenters repeated verbiage from the 
scripted directions to alleviate confusion. Explanation continued until participants correctly 
answered what each type of feedback in the given examples implied. Participants were told that 
experimenters were only interested in viewing how they played, not how well they played and 
were also told to do their best but not worry about performance. Participants were then told they 
could begin five games, where they were to attempt to solve five different codes. 
Dual N-Back Task. In the Dual N-Back, participants were read scripted instructions and 
then presented with demonstrations of potential Dual N-Back scenarios. Experimenters asked 
participants which button they would press in both a 1- and 2-back condition, given three trials of 
stimuli (consisting of a symbol on a grid, accompanied with a stated letter underneath). After 
addressing questions from the interactive example, the experimenter told participants to “do your 
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best, but do not worry about performance”.  Participants then played five full rounds of the Dual-
N Back.  
Simon Game. In the Simon game, participants were read scripted directions but were not 
given any visual examples. They performed one game with experimenter feedback, if needed, to 
reduce any technical challenges regarding game accessibility. Participants then played five games 
of Simon, with each round ending due to an error in repeating the pattern. 
         After finishing all three tasks, participants removed their glasses and were asked to report 
their age, school major or focus, if they had ever played any of these games before, and/or if they 
have ever played any similar games.  
Experimental Tasks 
 Code-Breaking Task.  An adapted computerized version of a popular children’s game 
was used to assess problem-solving capacities (shown in Figure 1). The objective of this task was 
to solve a four-item color code given six color options (red, orange, green, aqua, dark blue, 
black). Participants had 10 trials to solve a correct code and were given incremental feedback as 
to the accuracy of each attempt. After choosing four colors for a code (the repeat of colors was 
acceptable), they pressed a “check-move” button to receive feedback on that attempt. Yellow 
feedback pins appeared if a participant had placed any correct colored pegs in a correct position, 
and white feedback pins appeared if any colors selected were correct but were in the wrong 
position. For example, in Figure 1a the first attempt made was: red, green, orange, aqua. After 
clicking check move, three white feedback pins appeared which indicated three of the colors 
chosen were correct (1 incorrect), but none were in the correct location (lack of yellow pins). The 
location of given feedback pins was not intended to correspond to the location of the colors in 
the correct code; therefore, feedback referred to the attempt overall. 
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The participant continued to make attempts until either ten attempts were made, or the 
code was correctly solved. Each participant had five codes to solve, in which 10 trials were given 
to solve each code (50 trials possible in total). In the standard condition (same as Figure 1a), all 
five rounds were played as normal. In the two-trial condition (Figure 1b) in rounds three through 
five, participants were only able to view their two previous attempts when choosing colors for a 
new attempt. In other words, previous attempts and their feedback disappeared as one moved 
through the task, as to only leave two previous attempts available to a participant. In the zero-
trial condition (Figure 1c) participant’s attempts disappeared when a color was selected for a new 
attempt in all rounds. Due to this, participants could still view feedback for their current attempt 
as long as they desired; however, they were never able to view any attempts or feedback when 
actively making an attempt. Participants took 20 minutes on average to complete this task. Since 
this was the only self-paced task included in the protocol, if a participant reached 30 minutes in-
task and were not beyond round 3, participants were reminded “we are not concerned with 
performance, just how you play, so do your best, but don’t worry about performance”. 
 
 
      
      
 
      
      
 Figure 1a.                                           Figure 1b.                                      Figure 1c. 
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 Dual-N-Back. The Dual N-Back (Figure 2) is a computerized working memory task that 
involves simultaneously seeing and hearing a sequence of visual and auditory stimuli while 
deciding whether the stimulus you are looking at or seeing is a match to one that you were 
presented with (n) times ago (range: 1-3). The methods and program used were developed by 
Jaeggi et al. (2008). Participants were given 20 stimulus presentations, with 3 seconds to view 
each stimulus before the next one was shown. Stimulus presentations consisted of a blue square 
flashing on a grid, and this was accompanied by a letter sound. There were nine possible 
positions for the blue square and eight possible letter sounds.  
In the Dual 1-Back, participants had to decide if the current blue square was in the same 
position as it was 1 stimulus prior, while simultaneously deciding if the current letter sound was 
a match to the sound heard one stimulus ago. If what the participant was seeing was a position 
match, they would press the left button, and if what they were hearing was an auditory match, 
they would press the right button. After finishing a set of 20 presentations for a given N-Back 
(always beginning with 1-Back in game 1), a score of 68% correct responses or higher would 
move them onto the next numerical “N”-Back round (e.g., a 2-Back). A score of lower than 68% 
moved a participant to the next game (e.g., if a participant received a score of 50% on game 1, 1-
Back, they would then move to the next game, starting again at 1-Back (game 2, 1-Back)). The 
task is played 5 full times, with each round consisting of a 1-Back, and then a potential 2- or 3-
Figure 1. Above are three images from the code-breaking task. Participants must use 
incremental feedback to solve a four-item color code. Figure 1a shows the standard condition, 
where all attempts and feedback are visible throughout the task. Figure 1b shows the two-trial 
condition; on rounds 3 through 5, two attempts were visible at a time. Figure 1c shows the 
zero-trial condition after a participant had started a new attempt, where no attempts are visible. 
In all conditions, there was no time limit for viewing available feedback.  
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Back depending on the individual participants’ scores (3-Back being the highest N that was able 
to be reached). Participants played the Dual N-Back for 20 minutes on average.  
 
 
 
   
 Figure 2a. Stimulus 1                   Figure 2b. Stimulus 2                       Figure 2c. Stimulus  
 
 Simon Game. In this computerized version of a popular children’s game (Figure 3), the 
objective is to recall a sequence of colors in the correct order. On the screen, participants saw a 
circular stimulus with four color sections (red, yellow, green, and blue). In this task, tone was 
eliminated to focus on just one aspect of storage (visuospatial) due to its necessity in the code-
breaking game.  In each round, participants saw an incrementally larger sequence of colors flash 
on the screen. The presentation started with just one-color flashing for 1 second in the first 
round. Once the color flashed on the screen, participants needed to repeat the color they saw by 
clicking on its position. If they correctly repeated that color, a “go” button appeared. To move on 
to the next step in the sequence, the go button was pressed, and the sequence began again, 
growing to two color items in the second round; the previous color would remain the same, and a 
new color would be added on to the end of the pattern. Colors could be repeated in the sequence 
up to two times in a row. The sequence kept growing until the participant either made a mistake 
Figure 2. In the Dual N-Back, participants are asked to recall a sequence of visual and auditory stimuli. 
Above is an example of three visual stimuli, presented one at a time, in the Dual N-Back (9 possible 
square positions). Not pictured are letter sounds (8 possible) that were presented simultaneously with 
the visual stimuli as they appeared. The objective of the Dual N-back was for participants to decide if 
the blue square position, letter sound, or both being presented was a match the one presented N stimuli 
prior (with N starting at one and increasing incrementally by one each round). 
).  
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in repeating the pattern or ran out of time in the task. The timer was set for 5 seconds per number 
of colors in the sequence and would begin counting down at the start of the sequence 
presentation. When participants made a mistake, a “game over” screen would appear. 
Participants also played this task five times. 
 
      
      
          
     
    Figure 3. The Simon game 
 
Analyses and Coding  
 Code-Breaking Task. To measure problem-solving success overall, an average number of 
wins (out of five games) was calculated for each participant. Then, the average number of attempts 
(or trials) needed to reach a solution was calculated for each participant across rounds, and then 
across condition. 
 Efficiency of Information Gathering. An efficiency of information gathering score was 
coded to determine the level to which an attempt made provided new or useful information for the 
solution. Operationally, this was determined by identifying whether the attempt provided 
redundant information (i.e., did the attempt provide information that had already been discovered?) 
Figure 3. In the Simon game, the participants’ objective was to repeat the pattern of colors 
presentenced to them on the screen. When the pattern was presented, buttons would look like they 
were being pressed down and darkened. In the first round, one color would be presented, then the 
participants’ computer mouse would re-appear on the screen, indicating for them to click on the 
color they had seen. If repeated correctly, the following rounds would repeat the same color pattern, 
with a new color being added to the end of the sequence with each round. The game continued to 
increase in rounds until the participant made a mistake in repeating the pattern.   
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and/or if the response did not adequately consider previous information given (e.g., information 
given implies no pins were in the correct position, but positions from that attempt were 
subsequently repeated). Efficiency scores were coded for each attempt made (excluding the first 
attempt, as there was no previous information to consider) with each receiving a score of a 0, 1, or 
2 for the overall response.  A response was scored a 0 if all four selected items provided redundant 
information. A score of 1 described an attempt that either (a) included some but not all redundant 
information, or (b) ignored some but not all previous information. A score of 2 was assigned to 
attempts that included all new information and/or adequately considered previous information. An 
average efficiency score was calculated across the five games. In order to also get a better 
description of the breakdown of average activity within a game, a proportion of each score type 
(0, 1, 2) was also calculated. Two coders blind re-coded a random subset of ten videos (not 
formerly coded by themselves) in order to calculate reliability. A score of 93.76% overall match 
existed between coders prior to agreement being found.  
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4. Above is an example visual of a simplified version of this task, where there are 
only four color options, and no possibility of repeating colors in the code. Pictured is a target 
correct code with two attempts, and a number next to each attempt indicating how many 
positions were correct. Directly next to the feedback is a visual representation of the possible 
solution space, given the feedback received. In the first attempt, we see no color positions 
are correct. In the second attempt, the participant does not repeat any color positions, gaining 
new information and further narrowing the scope of possible solutions. Attempt two would 
therefore receive a 2 for an efficiency of information gathering score; all previous 
information was considered, and new information was gained where appropriate.  
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Dual N-Back. In traditional working memory tasks, an average across all Dual N-Back 
trials (N-1, N-2, and N-3) is calculated as a description of performance. However, each N-Back 
trial has inherently different working memory demands; thus, it was essential to determine an 
average of each individual N-Back trial. Due to the fact that the code-breaking task was played 
first, initial analyses examined whether there was an interaction between code-breaking task 
condition and scores in each 1, 2, or 3-Back. Afterward, associations between working memory 
scores in the Dual N-Back and problem-solving performance, attempts, and efficiency were 
investigated.  
Simon Game. This task collected a relative measure of short-term item-span capacity. 
The sum of the last sequence of items the participant was able to repeat was taken and averaged 
across five tasks for all participants. Initial analyses examined if an interaction between code-
breaking task condition and scores in the Simon game existed. Afterward, associations between 
working capacity scores in the Simon game and problem-solving performance, attempts, and 
efficiency were investigated. 
Results 
 Individual ANOVAs were performed to compare dependent measures of attempts made, 
number of wins, and efficiency scores, with problem-solving (PS) condition types as the between 
subjects factor. It was hypothesized that those in the highest demand condition (zero-trial) would 
have lower efficiency and number of wins, as well as a higher number of attempts as compared 
to those in the standard and two-trial conditions. 
  Next, an ANOVA investigating differences between scores in the Dual N-Back by PS 
group condition was performed on overall Dual N-Back scores, as well as N-1, N-2, and N-3 
individually. No differences between groups on overall performance or between tasks in the Dual 
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N-Back were hypothesized. Additionally, correlations were performed to investigate the 
relationship between working memory in the Dual N-Back task and PS attempts, number of 
wins, and efficiency.  
 Next, an ANOVA comparing scores in the Simon game with group condition as the 
between-subjects factor was performed to investigate if any group differences that could be due 
to either individual differences or recent exposure to the taxing task existed. No group difference 
in this task was hypothesized. Then, correlations were performed to investigate the relationship 
between short-term storage in the Simon game and PS attempts, number of wins and efficiency. 
Lastly, a correlation was performed to see the extent to which Simon game and Dual N-Back 
tasks were associated with one another. With each analysis performed, Hedges g was used as a 
measure of effect size. This was chosen due to the fact that this is a novel task that does not have 
any standardized population means.  
Code-Breaking Task 
An ANOVA revealed there was a significant difference between problem-solving groups 
in number of wins (out of five) [F(2,83) = 5.94, p = .004]. Post-hoc analyses revealed the condition 
with the lowest imposed cognitive load demand (standard) condition won more games (M = 3.21, 
SD = 1.52) than the highest cognitive load demand (zero-trial) condition (M = 1.89, SD = 1.10) [g 
= 1.31, p = .001]. The intermediate cognitive load demand (two-trial) condition (M = 2.62, SD = 
1.64) did not differ significantly from the standard [g = .59, p = .34] or zero-trial [g = .73, p = .13] 
condition. 
 An ANOVA regarding differences in the number of attempts made towards the solution 
between the three cognitive load conditions revealed there was a significant difference between 
group conditions [F(2, 83) =  5.24, p = .007]. Post-hoc analyses revealed that the standard condition 
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(M = 7.90, SD = 1.28) required significantly fewer attempts to achieve a correct solution than the 
zero-trial condition (M = 8.84, SD =   .80) [g = .94, p = .005]. The standard condition did not differ 
from the two-trial condition (M  = 8.20, SD = 1.20) [g = .31, p = .61] and the two-trial condition 
also did not differ significantly from the zero-trial condition [g = .63, p = .06]. 
 Efficiency of Information Gathering. An ANOVA regarding efficiency scores (range 0-2) 
also revealed a significant difference between group conditions [F(2, 83) = 17.66, p < 0.001]. The 
standard condition (M = 1.40, SD = .18) scored significantly higher than the two-trial condition 
(M = 1.29, SD = .16) [g = .11, p = .04] and the zero-trial condition (M = 1.16, SD = .11) [g = .24, 
p < 0.001]. The two-trial condition also scored significantly higher than the zero-trial condition [g 
= .13, p = .002].  
 An ANOVA was then run to investigate differences between the average proportion of 
times each specific efficiency score was observed between conditions. For efficiency scores of 0 
(least efficient: no previous information used, no new information gained), there was a significant 
difference between group conditions in proportion of attempts that scored this score [F(2, 83) =  
7.39, p =  .001]. The standard condition (M = 1.43%, SD = 3.04%) made inefficient attempts (score 
0) significantly less than the zero-trial condition (M = 5.06%, SD = 3.98%) [g = 0.036,  p =  .001]. 
The standard condition did not differ from the two-trial condition (M = 3.02% , SD = 3.64%) [g = 
.02,  p = .18], and the two-trial condition also did not differ from the zero-trial condition [g = .02,  
p  = .12] 
 For efficiency scores of 1 (intermediate efficiency, some but not all previous information 
used or new information gained) there was a significant difference between conditions [F(2, 83) = 
11.15, p< .001]. The standard condition (M = 62.41%, SD = 16.81%) made attempts with 
intermediate efficiency less often than the zero-trial condition (M = 78.46%, SD = 8.27%) [g = .16, 
   22
p  < .001] and the two-trial condition (M = 69.79%, SD = 11.84%) used less intermediate efficiency 
attempts than the zero-trial condition [g = .09, p = .006].  The standard condition did not differ 
from the two-trial condition [g = .07, p = .140]. 
 For efficiency scores of 2 (highest efficiency; attempt made use of all current information, 
gained all new information, or a combination of the two) there was a significant difference between 
all group conditions [F(2, 83) =  14.90, p < .001]. Those in the standard condition (M =  36.16%, 
SD = 16.36%) attempted efficiently marginally significantly more than those in the two-trial 
condition (M =  27.20%, SD =  12.09%) [g = .09 p = .055] and those in the standard condition 
attempted efficiently more often than those in the zero-trial condition   (M = 17.54%, SD = 8.95%) 
[g = .19, p < .001]. Those in the two-trial condition also attempted efficiently more often than those 
in the zero-trial condition [g = .10, p = .003].  
 In sum, the data were in agreement with the main hypotheses. Those in the high cognitive 
load demand condition (zero-trial) were less successful and less efficient at finding a code, and 
also used more attempts to do so; those in the lowest demand condition (standard) solved the 
code more often, had fewer attempts and overall better efficiency, as predicted (see Table 1). 
Dual N-Back task  
An ANOVA revealed a significant difference between problem-solving task condition 
groups on overall Dual N-Back task score [F(2, 83) = 3.46, p  = .04]. The standard condition (M 
= 57.99%, SD = 9.62%) scored significantly lower than the zero-trial condition (M = 64.31%, SD 
= 9.35%) [g = .06, p = .04]. The standard condition did not score differently than the two-trial 
condition (M = 60.54%, SD = 8.29%) [g = .03, p = .53], and the two-trial condition did not score 
differently than the zero-trial condition [g = .04, p = .25] 
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 Although there were no significant group differences in the N-1 or N-3 portions of the 
task [N-1: F(2, 83) = 2.43, p = .09; N-3: F(2, 83) = 1.11, p = .34], there was a difference between 
groups on performance in the N-2 task [F(2, 83) = 5.10, p = .008]. A post-hoc test revealed that 
the standard condition (M = 38.04%, SD = 15.70%) scored significantly lower the zero-trial 
condition (M = 50.26%, SD = 12.74%) [g = .12, p = .006]. The standard condition did not differ 
from the two-trial [g = .08, p = .15] and the two-trial did not differ from the zero-trial [g = .05, p 
= .42] 
 Dual N-Back and Code-Breaking Task. There was no correlation between N-1 scores and 
attempts made in standard condition (r = -.10, p = .62), or the two-trial condition (r = .10, p = .61). 
There was, however, an association between Dual N-Back scores in the N-1 and attempts made in 
the zero-trial condition (r = -.47, p = .01), indicating that higher WM scores were associated with 
less PS attempts in this condition.  In the N-2, scores and attempts made also had no correlation in 
the standard condition (r = -.18, p = .36), or the two-trial condition (r = -.04, p = .85). There was, 
however, a correlation in the zero-trial condition (r = -.49, p = .008). Scores in the N-3 and attempts 
made did not correlate in the standard condition (r = -.08, p = .67), the two-trial condition (r = -
.17, p = .39) or in the zero-trial condition (r = -.22, p = .27). 
 There was no correlation between N-1, N-2 or N-3 scores and number of wins in the 
standard condition (N-1: r = .17, p = .40; N-2: r = .08, p = .67; N-3: r = .01, p = .98) or the two-
trial, (N-1: r =.06 , p = .74; N-2: r = .14, p = .48; N-3: r = .23, p = .23). There was a correlation in 
the zero-trial in the N-1 and N-2 (N-1: r = .44, p = .02; N-2:  r = .48, p = .01), but not the N-3 (r = 
.183, p = .35).  
 There was no correlation between N-1 scores and efficiency in standard condition (r = .12, 
p = .54) and the two-trial condition (r = -.09, p = .64). There was, however, a correlation in the 
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zero-trial condition (r = .39, p = .04). In the N-2, scores and efficiency were not related in the 
standard condition (r = .16, p = .39), the two-trial condition (r = .19, p = .33) or in the zero-trial 
condition (r = .18, p = .36). In the N-3, scores and efficiency were also not related in the standard 
condition (r = .09, p = .62), the two-trial condition (r = .19, p = .32) or in the zero-trial condition 
(r = .01, p = .96). 
 In sum, those in the zero-trial condition scored higher in the Dual-Back as compared to 
those in the standard condition. Although this was not hypothesized, correlations found between 
Dual N-Back and problem-solving attempts as well as efficiency in specifically the zero-trial 
condition also support this association (Table 2). 
 Simon game 
An ANOVA revealed there were no significant differences between problem-solving task 
condition groups on Simon game performance [F(2, 83) = 1.19, p  = .31]. The standard condition 
(M = 7.29, SD = 1.54), two-trial condition (M = 8.28, SD = 2.79) and zero-trial condition (M = 
7.84, SD = 2.82) all scored very similarly, remembering about 7-8 colors in a sequence on average 
(see table 2).  
 Simon Game and Code-Breaking Task. Correlations revealed that the association between 
score in the Simon game and average attempts made was marginally significant (r = -.209, p = 
.053). This implies that those who scored higher on the Simon game often made fewer attempts in 
the code-breaking game. There was, however, a slightly stronger association between number of 
wins and Simon scores (r = .234, p = .030). In terms of efficiency, there was not a significant 
correlation between the Simon game and average efficiency scores in the problem-solving task 
overall (r = .12, p = .27).   
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 In sum, the Simon game was associated with overall problem-solving success but was only 
slightly correlated with average number of attempts, and not at all with efficiency.  
Simon and Dual N-Back 
There was a significant positive correlation between Simon performance and overall score 
in the Dual N-Back (r = .44, p < .001). This is also true when viewing scores in just the N-1 (r = 
.39, p <. .001) and N-2 (r = .46, p < .001), but not the N-3 (r = .165, p = .35). 
 Overall, this implies that performance on the two memory tasks are associated with each 
other. This might also suggest that the nature of the N-3 portion of this game might involve the 
largest amount of difference in cognitive processes necessary to execute the task.  
 
PS Task 
Condition 
 
Wins 
M (SD) 
Attempts 
M (SD) 
Efficiency 
score 
M (SD) 
Proportion 
of 0 
Efficiency 
Scores 
M (SD) 
Proportion 
of 1 
Efficiency 
Scores 
M (SD) 
Proportion 
of 2 
Efficiency 
Scores 
M (SD) 
Standard 
(n = 29) 
 
3.2 (1.52) 7.90 (1.28) 1.40 (.18) 
1.43% 
(3.05%) 
62.41% 
(16.81%) 
36.16% 
(16.36%) 
Two-trial: All 
Games 
 (n = 29) 
2.62 (1.63) 8.21 (1.20) 1.29/2 (.15) 
3.02% 
(3.64%) 
69.79% 
(11/84%) 
27.20% 
(12.09%) 
Zero-trial 
(n = 28) 
1.89 (1.10) 8.84 (.80) 1.16/2 (.11) 
5.06% 
(3.98%) 
78.46% 
(8.27%) 
17.54% 
(8.95%) 
Table 1. Performance in task by condition in the code-breaking task 
Two-trial: 
Games 3-5 
 (n = 29) 
1.34 (1.01) 8.60 (1.30) 1.25 (.18) 
3.54% 
(4.70%) 
72.09% 
(13.13%) 
24.37% 
(12.98%) 
Table 1a. Two-trial condition scores in the code-breaking task on exclusively rounds three 
through five, when information started to disappear. 
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Simon 
Score 
M (SD) 
N-Back 
Score 
(overall) 
M (SD) 
N-1 Score 
M (SD) 
N-2 Score 
M (SD) 
Percentage 
of 
Participants 
to play N-2 
M (SD) 
N-3 
Score 
M (SD)  
Percentage 
of 
Participants 
to play N-3 
M (SD) 
All 
conditions 
(n = 86) 
7.84 (2.39) 
60.91% 
(9.36%) 
 
77.86% 
(14.98%) 
 
44.49% 
(15.17%) 
 
- 
31.89% 
(12.58%) 
 
- 
Standard 
(n = 29) 
7.29 (1.54) 
57.99% 
(9.62%) 
74.44% 
(15.20%) 
38.04% 
(15.70%) 
67.59% 
(21.34%) 
29.17% 
(7.63%) 
8.28% 
(5.77%) 
Two-trial 
(n = 29) 
8.28 (2.79) 
60.54% 
(8.29%) 
76.57% 
(13.98%) 
45.58% 
(14.73%) 
74.67% 
(21.68%) 
28.65% 
(11.41%) 
14.00% 
(7.60%) 
Zero-trial 
(n = 28) 
7.84 (2.82) 
64.31% 
(9.35%) 
82.74% 
(14.98%) 
50.26% 
(12.74%) 
80.71% 
(13.74%) 
35.14% 
(14.38%) 
18.52% 
(9.34%) 
Table 2. Performance in memory tasks overall, as well as by condition 
 
Discussion 
Participants in the low memory demand condition (standard) performed best on the code-
breaking task, finding more solutions overall, as well as finding them with the highest level of 
efficiency in their information-gathering activity. Working memory scores in the Dual N-Task 
were highest in the high demand condition (zero-trial), although this was not an expected result. 
Scores in the Simon game, a measure of short-term visuospatial sketchpad capacity, did not 
differ by condition, with all groups being able to remember roughly 7-8 items on average. 
Average wins, attempts, and efficiency of information gathering scores in the code-breaking task 
were significantly associated with working memory scores for participants in the high demand 
(zero-trial) but not significantly in the intermediate (two-trial) or low demand (standard) 
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conditions. Across the whole sample scores in the Simon game were associated with overall 
success in the problem-solving task, but not strongly associated with efficiency or number of 
attempts.  
These findings provide evidence for a link between information gathering in a problem-
solving context and demands on working memory (whether these demands are storage, resource, 
or retention based).  Efficiency in the code-breaking task requires participants to structure 
guesses so that they maximize information gain. The findings show that increasing the demand 
for what is held in the mental workspace decreases performance on the code-breaking task, but 
also seems to improve working memory performance. The implications of these findings for our 
understanding of how cognitive load (demands on mental workspace) shapes problem-solving 
performance are considered in the next section. 
Problem-Solving Task Performance and Cognitive Load 
As predicted, there were observed differences in efficiency of information gathering 
between groups, with those in the zero-trial condition having the lowest efficiency and those in 
the standard condition having the highest efficiency. This supports many of the findings found in 
the cognitive load literature suggesting that it is difficult to learn effectively (e.g., strategies for 
efficiency) when multiple systems are competing for processing (Ayres & Paas, 2012; Sweller, 
1988). However, it might also be the case that the exact situation of cognitive demands in this 
context are just essentially not well experienced, therefore the knowledge base is not well 
organized to task demands.  Due to the fact that the problem presented in this task required the 
coordination of multiple mental resources, as well as ongoing processing, it is possible that this 
demand constrained participants in the two or zero-trial condition in such a way that the 
resources available to them to execute the task were inefficiently organized to the problem. 
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When information in a problem-space is not immediately available, demands on processes such 
as working memory increase in order to store and coordinate relevant information that one might 
be searching for. At the same time, it seems as if the balance of cognitive resources by which 
these higher-order tasks are accomplished might necessarily shift to compensate for this change 
in demand, thus changing the resources by which one might execute the task. In the highest 
cognitive load demand condition (zero-trial) and intermediate demand (two-trial) condition, the 
ability to reach a solution, and the overall efficiency of reaching it, were significantly hampered 
when compared to the lowest demand (standard) condition. It is possible that this change in 
association of working memory and task performance between condition might reflect somewhat 
of a trade-off system for how certain cognitive resources are allocated given the context of the 
problem (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). 
Increased Cognitive Load, Better Working Memory  
 Scores for those in the highest demand condition (zero-trial) were significantly correlated 
with all measured aspects of problem-solving, although scores for those with no imposed 
demands, or an intermediate amount, were not significantly related (standard and two-trial 
conditions). A potential interpretation of these results might be that the task demands presented 
in the high demand condition likely solicited the use of working memory more robustly in order 
to be able to properly plan and execute steps in the given problem-space. Given the fact that the 
code-breaking task was always presented first, and that those in the high demand condition 
scored highest on the Dual N-Back task, there are several possible explanations. There is no 
direct evidence that high cognitive load tasks improve subsequent WM functioning generally 
speaking, however, the opposite has been found (Anderson, Reder & Lebiere, 1996). One 
possible explanation for this discrepant finding is that the nature of the zero-trial task activated 
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WM to an extent that participants in this condition were somewhat more primed for better 
performance in the Dual N-Back more specifically. In other words, it is possible that the nature 
of both the zero-trial PS task and the Dual N-Back task were such that the demand in the PS task 
was in a way priming the organization capacities necessary for success in the subsequent 
working memory task. Another possibility is the pre-existence of group differences underlying 
the difference in Dual N-Back scores following the problem-solving task. This can be addressed 
in follow-up studies by counter-balancing all three tasks and observing if this difference in 
groups persists. If the difference between conditions on Dual N-Back scores does not persist 
when the problem-solving task is played after the Dual N-Back, then there would be reason to 
support a potential activation hypothesis. 
Code-Breaking Task and Working Memory 
The Dual N-Back task was chosen due to its inclusion of all three of Baddeley’s 
components of working memory (phonological loop, visuospatial sketchpad, central executive) 
and was therefore predicted to be associated with all aspects of PS, regardless of condition. This 
was hypothesized because WM is needed to coordinate sources of incoming information with 
ongoing strategy while also evaluating performance and planning future steps; something 
presumably needed to be successful in the code-breaking task. However, no such association was 
found.  This lack of association in the standard and two-trial conditions implies that the nature of 
the problems presented in these contexts were variably demanding of WM to an extent that the 
standard and two-trial conditions didn’t rely on WM much, if at all, to complete the task. Under 
this notion, one could consider that overall measures of working memory are more associated 
with problem-solving when there is no easily accessible or automated strategy for organizing 
information about attempts. This would support Meyer et al.’s (2010) developmental work that 
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suggests the central executive’s processing aspects of WM are more related to solving 
mathematical word problems when one is less experienced at organizing units of information, 
and less related when one does not need robust processing to execute a problem.  
 Simon scores were related to overall number of wins across all conditions. This is 
consistent with a general finding that short-term storage-based tasks are related to overall success 
in problem-solving (Bull & Johnston, 1997). Since no previous work has used this specific 
memory task in relation to problem-solving, the current findings enhance what is understood 
about the role of this ability in more specific measures of PS activity (attempts and efficiency of 
information gathering). The Simon game involved the storage of visuospatial information as well 
as mechanisms of rehearsal (a strategy well used and known to adults), both of which are 
necessary for success in varying conditions of the code-breaking game.  
Developmental Implications: Connecting Micro to Macro 
How a problem is specified, and what type of problem it might be, changes as we gain 
experience in the problem’s domain. Many of the problems that children encounter in the natural 
world are likely ill-defined, given their limited knowledge. Therefore, how children gather 
information is crucial to how they solve problems. The problem presented in the code-breaking 
task was well-defined, albeit unfamiliar to adults, and thus, required information gathering in 
order to organize an effective strategy. Because this same problem can be used with kids, the 
information gathering process in children and adults can be directly compared. From Karmiloff-
Smith’s (1979) view, even though adults will have different metaprocedures available, the 
microlevel process of adjusting representation to the problem-solving context is separable from 
these metaprocedures. How visual attention is allocated during the task might provide some 
insight into how cognitive load is managed and changes as adults and children acquire code-
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breaking skills. Visual attention might be independent of higher-level strategies, such as 
rehearsal, which does not tend to be as familiar to young children as it is to adults. Visual 
attention might also reflect a kind of visuospatial rehearsal. There isn’t a great deal known about 
microlevel aspects of problem-solving in children, therefore the adult data in the code-breaking 
task provides a suitable starting point for generating hypotheses about the very nature of this 
process.  
Conclusion 
 The code-breaking task provides a direct measure of information gathering in a problem-
solving context. This is important due to how little is understood about how adults generally solve 
problems. Due to the fact that most of the research to date has focused on well-defined problems 
that do not require information gathering, the current findings provide insight into how participants 
coordinate information in a mental workspace when less information is initially known. 
Performance in the code-breaking task demonstrated the relative influence cognitive load has in 
an information gathering context. Associations between standard working-memory tasks and 
performance in the code-breaking task indicated that cognitive load did indeed have an impact on 
information gathering; however, this cannot be simply interpreted as a storage limit. This code-
breaking task also provided a platform to both characterize the general adult capacity to solve 
problems, as well as to consider developmental differences in the microlevel processes that 
organize information gathering to a problem.    
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Appendix: Supplementary Information  
 
Figure S1: Bar graph demonstrating the average number of wins in each condition. Bars indicate 
a significant difference between the standard and zero-trial conditions.  
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Figure S2: Bar graph demonstrating the average attempts in each condition. Bars indicate a 
significant difference between the standard and zero-trial conditions. 
Figure S3: Bar graph of efficiency scores in each condition. Bars indicate a significant difference 
between all conditions. 
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Figure S4: Proportion of each efficiency score used within each condition. The legend indicates 
which color each score is represented by. The corresponding p-values indicate if there was a 
significant difference between groups in the average proportion of times the attempts received 
each score (i.e., 0, 1 and 2).  
 
Figure S5: Bar graph of Simon game scores by condition.  
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Figure S6: Scatter plot showing associations between Simon and overall wins. 
 
 
Figure S7: Scatter plot showing associations between Simon and efficiency of information 
gathering scores. 
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Figure S8: Bar graph of overall Dual N-Back scores between conditions. Bars indicate a 
significant difference between the standard and zero-trial conditions.  
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Figure S9: Bar graph of Dual N-Back scores in the N-1 portion of the task, between conditions. 
 
 
Figure S10: Bar graph of Dual N-Back scores in the N-2 portion of the task, between conditions. 
Bars indicate a significant difference between the standard and zero-trial conditions. 
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Figure S11: Bar graph of  Dual N-Back scores in the N-3 portions of the task, between 
conditions. 
 
 
Figure S12: Scatter plot showing association between Dual N-Back scores and average wins in 
the code-breaking game  
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Figure S13: Scatter plot showing association between Dual N-Back scores and average attempts 
in the code-breaking game 
 
Figure S14:  Scatter plot showing association between Dual N-Back scores and average 
efficiency scores in the code-breaking game 
 
 
 
